1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON		
2	AT SEATIFIE		
3	WASHINGTON TOXICS COALITION, et) al.		
4	Plaintiffs,) Case No. C01-132C	
5	v.) Seattle, Washington) December 9, 2003	
б	ENVIDONMENTAL PROTRACTON)	
7	et al.,	FILEDENTERED	
8	Defendants.) LODGEDRECEIVED	
9	and	DEC 15 2003 KN	
10	AMERICAN CROP PROTECTION	AT SEATTLE) CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON DEPUTY	
11	ASSOCIATION, et al.,		
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13	01-CV-00132-TN		
14	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS		
	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR		
15	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE		
16			
17	For the Plaintiffs: Par	cti A. Goldman	
18	Amy	Amy Williams-Derry Earthjustice	
19	70!	Second Avenue, Suite 203 attle, Washington 98104-1711	
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    Proceedings recorded by computer-aided stenography.
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             THE CLERK: Case No. C01-132, Washington Toxics versus
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    EPA.
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             THE COURT: Make your appearances, please.
             MS. GOLDMAN: Patti Goldman and Amy Williams-Derry for
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    the plaintiffs.
             MR. HETTENBACH: Wayne Hettenbach, Department of
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    Justice, for the defendants.
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             MR. KLISE: Good morning, Your Honor. Michael Klise
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    for the intervenors.
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             THE COURT: Okay. Let me tell you why I wanted to get
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    together with you, and that is that there are several things in
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    the proposed forms of order that -- I want to tell you what I
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    propose to do, and then I want you to again try to see if you
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    can agree upon the language of the injunction. And if not, then
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    have competing forms. I want to give you guidance as to what
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    should go into the injunction.
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        The first issue that I identify the parties as being apart
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    from one another on is whether the ordinary high watermark of
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    waters where salmon are ordinarily found should be the scope of
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    the injunction. And that is what I'm going to do. Not waters
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where salmon are -- that are theoretically accessible to salmon.

But I do propose to include estuaries to the extent that salmon are ordinarily found in those estuaries.

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And I wanted some guidance from you as to whether the proposal that the defendants suggested, that is, looking to the database available on www.streamnet.org for determining which streams actually support salmon is a workable proposal.

MS. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, the StreamNet database is comprehensive in Oregon, although it does not include estuaries. It does not exist in California. The substitute that the defendants have proposed is designed to identify surface waters, not salmon presence.

And in Washington there's a competing database, and
Washington is turning to a habitat type of model, rather than
fish detections. So it's not comprehensive throughout
Washington state.

THE COURT: What is there that a party reading the injunction could look at and say I can go to this and decide whether I am confronted with a stream that has salmon in it?

MS. GOLDMAN: In Oregon, StreamNet would be useful.

In -- one comprehensive description of salmon-bearing streams and waters is the critical habitat designations by the National Marine Fisheries Service, many of which have been vacated. But they accurately describe the stream reaches up to impassable barriers where salmon are found at some point in the year, and they do include the estuaries. That would be comprehensive.

It is not accessible in an internet web base, or some kind 1 2 of consumer-friendly access system, but it is an accurate 3 description. THE COURT: How big a document is this? 4 MS. GOLDMAN: Well, they are federal register notices 5 for various salmon listings. They are single-spaced, small 6 7 print, probably several pages each of the identifying areas. 8 There are descriptors, but the descriptors would be salmon-9 bearing streams and waters in a certain geographical reach, and 10 that doesn't tell you exactly where the salmon are. 11 THE COURT: What do you think we should do if we are 12 going to do what I said, that is, limit the scope of the 13 injunction to salmon-bearing streams and estuaries? 14 MS. GOLDMAN: That had actually been our intent by 15 describing waters -- types of water bodies used by salmon. we used the word "accessible," we didn't realize we were 16 17 triggering the objection that later arose. Used by salmon is 18 what Oregon states in its law and what CropLife has stated in its preliminary brief. 19 20 I think people tend to know if salmon streams near where 21 their crops are and where they live are salmon bearing at some 22 point of the year, and that's generally how the states identify salmon-bearing waters. 23

THE COURT: Okay. What's your reaction?

MR. HETTENBACH: If the Court's intention is to limit

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the injunction to the areas where the waterways for salmon ordinarily are, the plaintiffs proposal goes further than that.

By using critical habitat as they recommended using for Oregon -- let's take Oregon and Washington, because California is a separate case because of the availability of data.

If you use critical habitat for Oregon and Washington, critical habitat is a geographic designation. The National Marine Fisheries Service looks at an area and says we're just going to carve out this area. That -- that area includes many, many streams where salmon aren't actually there.

That's why under EPA's proposal we say take the StreamNet database, which looks for where salmon are, and then overlay that with the critical habitat designations that NMFS has provided, and from that you can determine which streams ordinarily bear salmon. There may be some streams that are outside.

And the reason you do the overlay is because there may be a few streams that go outside of critical habitat where salmon actually are. So by doing the overlay you eliminate the streams inside of critical habitat that don't ordinarily support salmon, and you pick up whatever else you may miss with critical habitat just by using that definition.

So the plaintiffs -- the way the plaintiffs have worded it doesn't really get at what the Court wants to do. The way we've worded it we think does.

I want to talk about California just briefly, because 1 California is a separate -- we described it differently for 2 California primarily because we don't have the benefit of 3 4 something like StreamNet, where the work has already been done to determine where the salmon are. 5 What EPA has proposed is in those instances to use critical 6 7 habitat as a surrogate, and that is actually overinclusive. 8 We're going to capture waterways in that situation where salmon actually are not. But we don't have -- and that is an overlay 9 10 with USGS stream maps. That will tell you actually where the streams are, and what are streams. 11 THE COURT: Is the injunction limited to Washington, 12 13 Oregon and California? MR. HETTENBACH: Yes, Your Honor. That's the way it 14 15 was worded, yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: So what about using StreamNet for Oregon, what he's proposing for California, and what for Washington? 17 18 MR. HETTENBACH: StreamNet also. They've surveyed 19 Washington. StreamNet has data on Washington and Oregon. 20 THE COURT: Is that right? MS. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, StreamNet is a database that 21 22

has information supplied by state fish & wildlife agencies, and Washington does participate. Unfortunately, there's a competing database, and so it is not the place all of the data are sent.

And that's not -- it's not as up-to-date and it's not as

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1 comprehensive.

If the Court wanted to describe the water bodies used by salmon, StreamNet would help people figure that out.

THE COURT: Why don't we -- can you live with using StreamNet for Washington and Oregon, and what he proposes for California?

MS. GOLDMAN: Well, the difficulty with California is that databases tend to identify surface waters, and it's on a very coarse scale, so it won't catch all of the salmon-bearing waters.

THE COURT: I think maybe that it's as good as we can get, okay?

MS. GOLDMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: So do it that way, all right?

MS. GOLDMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: I propose that the injunction will exclude all pesticides and herbicides as to which the EPA has made an NLAA determination. I think I said that at the last hearing. Then in the plaintiffs' proposed order at page -- at 9 there's an exclusion of certain pesticides which I am willing to live with. Do you hear what I'm saying?

Okay. Then on the size of the buffer zones, the one I had most question about was fenbutatin-oxide, where you propose a 200 yard aerial buffer zone.

MS. GOLDMAN: Yes, Your Honor. On fenbutatin-oxide, in

the effects determination EPA recommended that buffer zone for 1 2 aerial spraying and aerial air blast spraying. We were not sure whether the Court wanted to heed EPA's recommendation in the 3 effects determinations when they were larger than the 20 yard/ 4 100 yard buffers that we had asked for across-the-board, and 5 that's the issue that's presented with the fenbutatin-oxide 6 7 larger area. THE COURT: All right. Let's limit that one to 100 8 9 yards, okay? Otherwise, I propose to use the schedule of buffer zones that the plaintiffs proposed. Also, on the 10 non-applicability of the injunction to particular pesticide 11 12 application programs, including public health vector control programs, that's fine. 13 The defendants and plaintiffs disagree on noxious weed 14 programs. I propose to accept the plaintiffs' proposal in that 15 16 regard. 17 MR. HETTENBACH: Just a quick question for clarification. 18 19

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. HETTENBACH: I believe we had competing versions of the actual wording for the public health vector control. We worded slightly -- Your Honor indicated you would take one. didn't say whose you were inclined to take.

THE COURT: The plaintiffs.

MR. HETTENBACH: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: On the NMFS authorized programs, that is indoor uses, tree injection, et cetera, the plaintiffs' proposal in that regard is fine. The proposed notification, plaintiffs asked the Court to require EPA to inform registrants, et cetera, et cetera. The plaintiffs' language in that regard is fine.

The last significant issue that I have is the application of pesticides in urban areas. And as I understand it, the federal defendants are concerned about a label notice in that regard. Expand upon that, if you will, for me.

MR. HETTENBACH: Your Honor, what the plaintiffs have proposed in their order effectively is a ban on all sale of pesticide in urban areas (unintelligible) what they've proposed is to prohibit the sale until the label is changed.

There are several problems with that. First of all, to change a label EPA has to go through a FIFRA process. It's steps they have to go through in order to make those changes. The registrants have rights. They have -- there's a procedural process that can take a while.

What the EPA has proposed instead is to say we will have point of sale information available. So when someone goes in and buys one of these pesticides in an urban area, there is information right there that does all the things that the plaintiffs have complained about.

THE COURT: Where would it be located?

MR. HETTENBACH: It's impossible to say, because you're

dealing with different retailers and different areas. It would be available -- it's not something that is addressed, and that's a detail that we don't believe how you could control exactly where a retail outlet store would place it.

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We -- I think the language we used said was for -- it was to be provided with the product. So one would assume that that would be right where the product is on the shelves. And EPA would have this thing saying in urban areas you have to worry -- you shouldn't be -- you know, you have to be careful about runoff into areas.

The other problems with -- you'd have this point of sale distribution under EPA's proposal, and you'd have larger educational efforts that the order describes. The other big problem the way plaintiffs have worded this is that as EPA starts making these determinations about different pesticides that are -- the eight, some are having -- they're getting no effect determinations, some are NLAA determinations, the labels for each of those are going to have to be changing -- each time EPA makes a decision then the label either won't be accurate, or we're going to have to go through another process. That's a tremendous cost, that's a tremendous burden upon the agency to have to do that.

And conceivably because the findings are specific to different salmon streams, different ESUs where the salmon are, the same label couldn't be placed on the same pesticide in one

place as it is on the other. You'd have to have labels that were specific to certain towns.

THE COURT: Can you live with a point of sale notification that would have to be changed as the determinations are changed?

MR. HETTENBACH: Well, we -- EPA's -- the proposal they put forward is a point of sale notification, and what the notification would hopefully -- notification is a lot easier to change than it is to change a label, and that's what we have put forward.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from the plaintiffs.

MS. GOLDMAN: Your Honor, the difference between the two proposals is that ours would be a point of sale notification and EPA's would not necessarily be. It would prepare generic information that could be put near a product if somebody chooses to, but it would not be required.

We believe EPA has the authority to do this, and would direct the Court to the Chemical Manufacturers Association case in the Ninth Circuit, where California required point of sale notifications, and the industry challenged them on FIFRA preemption grounds.

And what the Ninth Circuit said is that point of sale notifications are not labeling, so they are not what is regulated through the FIFRA process. So there is no bar to

require them outside of the FIFRA process.

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And that was the ruling in the New York versus Jorling case as well, the Second Circuit decision. We cited both of those in our papers. So what we -- what we're asking for is very brief information that is not about how to use the pesticides, but is just a notice to the purchaser at the point of sale linked to the product. And we believe there's ample authority. Without costly label amendment processes, EPA could do a pesticide registration notice directing registrants to make this information available with the products at the point of sale.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from the intervenor.

MR. KLISE: Your Honor, we intervenors do have a substantive concern on this, and that is however the notification is made what is the substance of it to be. And we've explained in the paper that we filed along with the government's proposed form of order that we cannot go along with assuming the obligation to distribute information that in substance discourages people from using the very products we manufacture.

Rather, we do come down much more strongly on the side of the educational component, that is, educating people in the proper use of these products. And we think especially because this is simply interim relief, and not some kind of final decision that's going to be imposed by the EPA after consultation, that that more general type of an education

program is appropriate here.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's what we're going to do:
We're going to use the EPA proposal regarding the point of sale
notice, and with language as proposed by the plaintiffs in that
point of sale notification. All right?

Now ---

MS. GOLDMAN: Can I ask a question? Is there any requirement that the information be posted at the point of sale where these pesticides are sold?

THE COURT: It is required that it be available to the purchaser at the point of sale and in a way that the purchaser knows or receives a copy of the notice.

MS. GOLDMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. I want a proposed draft from plaintiffs of this injunction by December 15th, and any specific objections to language from the opposition by December 20th.

And get a copy of your proposal to them by fax or email on the 15th, so that there isn't a mail problem. And I will, in all events, try to enter an order before the year-end.

All right. Anything else?

MS. GOLDMAN: Yeah, I'd like to ask one other question. In referring to the StreamNet database, since that database does not include estuaries, I understood the Court to indicate estuaries should be included, so we should specify they are included, even though they're not identified.

1	THE COURT: Yes, to the extent that salmon use those		
2	estuaries.		
3	MS. GOLDMAN: Thank you.		
4	THE COURT: All right. Anything else?		
5	MR. KLISE: I have one point of clarification, Your		
6	Honor, and this also goes to the identification of the water		
7	bodies point. And I think you mentioned when we first started		
8	speaking you were referring to the ordinary high watermark,		
9	which is what plaintiffs proposed as the starting point of		
10	measuring the buffers. Defendants proposed order uses the		
11	actual waterline at the time. So I'm wondering which side of		
12	that issue you're coming down on.		
13	THE COURT: Ordinary high watermark.		
14	MR. KLISE: Thank you.		
15	THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess.		
16	(Recess.)		
17	CERTIFICATE		
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19	T. Tarank R. Bath. (666's 'all Greek Barankara da barankar		
20	I, Joseph F. Roth, Official Court Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is correct.		
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